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Peanut and corn are two major crops in the tri-state area of the Southeast US, an area 
encompassing North Florida, Southwest Georgia, and Southeast Alabama.  
Sharecroppers in this region apply higher amount of input in crop production than the
average farmers. We analyzed the behavior of sharecroppers in this region with regard to
their fertilizer application decisions.  Two hypotheses were formulated and tested based on
sharecroppers’ fertilizer application decisions: one assuming that sharecroppers are risk
averse farmers and the other assuming that sharecroppers are regret minimizers. Our
results show that a sharecropper uses different fertilizer treatments when minimizing risk
depending on risk perspective and desired income.  Sharecroppers who apply more
fertilizer to obtain a desired level of income are regret minimizers where as sharecroppers
who apply relatively low fertilizer are risk minimizer.  At the same desired level of income,
a regret minimizer farmer would apply a higher amount of fertilizer than the risk averse
farmers.  Our analysis revealed that sharecroppers in the Southeast US are regret
minimizers as they apply a higher amount of fertilizer than an average farmer on the major
crops grown in the region.  The result of this study also confirms the result of a previous
study in the region which reported that sharecroppers in the region are over capitalized
and apply more fertilizer than average farmers.  
Keywords: Southeast U.S., Sharecroppers, Regret minimizer, Risk averse, Peanut-            
Corn rotation￿
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Introduction
Sharecropping has been an accepted form of land tenancy in the Southeastern U.S. since
the antebellum period (Wells, 1987). It is still a common mode of land tenancy for
producers in the region using a peanut-corn rotation (M. Lamb, personal communication). 
Lamb estimates that peanut-corn sharecropping accounts for 10 percent of the total
cultivated acreage under this two-crop rotation system.  In our study, sharecroppers are
defined as those farmers who own capital and lease land by paying a share of the crop
output to the landowners.  The sharecroppers in the study area are characterized as
traditional small, part-time farmers with small cash reserves, gross annual sales less than or
equal to $40,000 and low rates of high school completion, compared with commercial
farmers (Nelson et al., 1991).
1 In sharecropping, landlords and  sharecroppers share inputs
and outputs, the ratios of which depend on several factors such as productivity of the land
and bargaining power of both landowner and sharecroppers (Barry et al. 2000; Paudel et
al. 1998). 
Nelson et al. (1991) determined in a survey of South Georgia farmers that low 
resource farmers including sharecroppers use fertilizer more extensively than commercial
farmers, and tend to overuse fertilizer compared with efficient levels.  Low Resources
Farmers (LRF) in this region use fertilizer least efficiently of all variable inputs.  At the
same time, fertilizer is the primary limiting input for corn rotated with peanuts in the￿
region.  The Alabama Cooperative Extension Service (ACES) estimates the total expense
of fertilizer to be $55 per acre per year, which represents about 35 percent of variable cost
in corn production (Crews et al., 1994).  Thus, improving efficiency in fertilizer use would
enhance sustainability of sharecroppers.
Traditionally, efficiency of the risk averse sharecropper has been considered for the
case of nonvarying input levels, where only one treatment choice is selected by the
sharecropper for an entire field.  The input application decision in this situation is similar
to that of an efficient landowner (Baron, 1982; Otsuka and Hayami, 1988; Allen and
Lueck, 1993).  If sharecroppers had the choice of negotiating varying input levels, such as
fertilizer treatments, the outcomes should reflect their risk perspective and offer insight
into the reasons LRFs overuse fertilizer.
We examine the case of corn-peanut sharecroppers in Alabama.  The decision
variables are acres on which different fertilizer combinations are applied, with five discrete
combinations of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash (NPK) representing the proportions of
primary nutrients. We apply two risk objectives - minimization of negative income
deviation and income regret minimization - to evaluate whether sharecroppers’ fertilizer
choices are influenced by their risk perspective.  If so, contractual arrangements that
account for risk perspective would be needed to improve the sustainability of these LRFs,
as opposed to merely enlarging farm size as recommended by Jones (1991).   The specific
objectives of this study are:
1.  To find the behavior of sharecroppers under two commonly used risk hypotheses,￿
2.  To explain the nature of different sharecroppers in each of these risk categories, and
3.  To explain how these risk models are useful in identifying sharecropper input decision
behavior.
Rationale 
Most studies in sharecropping have emphasized that sharecroppers apply less inputs than
landowners (Bernat, 1987; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Reid, 1979).  However, this claim
is only expected when sharecroppers are considered risk neutral.  When risk is considered
in sharecropping, the optimal input application behavior of a sharecropper changes
drastically.  The high input application behavior of sharecroppers is counterintuitive if
analyses reflect risk neutrality. In the current farming system in both developed and
developing countries, sharecropping is practiced when sharecroppers try to minimize risk
in farming.  Therefore, input and output risk perspective in sharecropping is necessary to
analyze sharecroppers’ behavior when uncertainty persist due to environmental and market
phenomenon.  The risk perspective used in this study could also be applied in developing
countries to determine the behavior of sharecroppers based on the major input application
in farming systems.
Reasons for Sharecropping and Two Hypotheses on Input Applications
Reasons for Sharecropping include limited technology, poor education, low wages, and
imperfections in factor markets for owner’s land and sharecropper’s labor (Chew 1993). 
The main reason for sharecropping in the Southeastern peanut region is to obtain economy￿
of size (M.Lamb, personal communication).  LRFs tend to be overcapitalized, with
machine sizes too large for the number of acres farmed (Nelson et al., 1991).  A
sharecropping contract may enable a LRF to improve the efficiency of mechanization by
increasing the amount of land farmed.  
According to Chew (1993), sharecropping is usually coincident with
unsophisticated technology and relatively low land productivity, so that monitoring
sharecropper efficiency is not required.  The landowner may resist adoption of expensive
technology by a sharecropper if the output share returned by the technology is less than
the cost share or loan invested by the landlord.  The choice of several different fertilizer
treatments in corn has potential for increasing yield without a large cost share by the
landlord, and may represent an alternative to capital investment for increasing landowner
and sharecropper Income above variable cost (IAVC).  IAVC is the net difference
between gross income and total variable cost.  
The sharecropper’s risk perspective depends on the landowner’s goals as well as
his or her own. Given that the contractual arrangement binds the landowner’s and the
sharecropper’s financial well-being together, there is an incentive for each to convince the
other to adopt the desired risk perspective.  If the sharecropper dominates, we hypothesize
that risk minimization is the goal, such that negative deviations from the average IAVC
expected over a planning horizon is minimized.  With limited off-farm employment, capital
and land, Southeastern sharecroppers who are LRFs want to avoid falling below a￿
maintenance income level.  This is critical in the region since the average annual net farm
income of LRFs is at or below the poverty line (Jones, 1991).  
If the landowner dominates, we hypothesize that regret minimization is the goal. 
Regret is the difference between IAVC that would result with perfect foresight about the
profit-maximizing production choices and IAVC realized from the actual choices.  The
Southeastern landowner’s household income is likely to come from both farm and off-farm
sources, so staying above a floor in the farm portion is less a concern than getting as close
as possible to a ceiling.  The landowner wants to minimize the cost of bad decisions on the
part of the sharecropper by contracting for the best possible management to maximize
yield without incurring costs that offset the yield gains.
We model the two risk perspectives - minimizing negative income deviation
(hereafter referred to as “risk minimizing”) and minimizing income regret (hereafter
referred to as “regret minimizing”) - using linear programming methods and compare the
results to observed conditions in the region.  For the risk minimizing sharecropper, we use
the Minimization of Total Absolute Deviation (MOTAD) model developed by Hazell
(1971).  In our example, a sharecropper plans to maintain his or her IAVC above the
average IAVC by choosing corn acreage allocated to each fertilizer level.  
The MOTAD model punishes the selection of enterprises that increase the negative
deviation of IAVC, a property not present in risk programs such as the mean-variance (E-
V) model.  We examine how fertilizer-acreage allocation and risk tolerance adjust to
varying target income levels.￿
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The sharecropper-landowner relationship in the Southeastern U.S. is characterized
by output and variable input cost sharing.  Profitability for the sharecropper is based on his
or her income above variable cost (IAVC).  Total IAVC from corn and peanuts in a given
year is 
where Ai is acres of corn on which the ith fertilizer treatment is used and Ap are acres of
peanuts, Qi and Qp are yields of corn in bushels per acre per fertilizer treatment and
peanuts in tons per acre, and Pc and Pp are output prices for corn in U.S. dollars per bushel
and for peanuts in dollars per ton.  The first term in equation 1 represents revenue from
the two enterprises with . being output share.  The second term in equation 1 is variable
cost for the enterprises, in which ri is the cost of the ith fertilizer level, Ai is acreage by
fertilizer treatment, rj and xij are the per unit cost of the jth category of other corn inputs
and the quantity used per acre per fertilizer treatment, rk and xk are the per unit cost of the
k
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Acreage summed across all corn fertilizer treatments is equal to total corn acreage,
with Ai ￿ 0 for all i treatments.  Other variable corn inputs include machinery, post-harvest
activities, herbicides, pesticides and soil amendments.  Variable peanut inputs are the same
five categories as for corn, plus P-K fertilizer.  A sharecropping system is defined for 0 <
., ￿ < 1, with the landowner’s shares equal to (1-.) and (1-￿).  We assumed output and
input cost shares equal 0.5.  This avoids the necessity of accounting for welfare losses
incurred under sharecropping (Chaudhuri 1994). Also, this assumption is consistent with
unrestricted bargaining between landowner and sharecropper, with reservation wage equal
to zero, which reflects conditions in the Southeastern U.S. (Arce 1995).  Equation 1 may
be used to calculate per acre IAVC of either of the two enterprises by setting the value of
acreage for one crop to zero and the other to one.  The detailed information about
variables used and their units are presented in Table 1.
The MOTAD Model
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In equation 2 the objective is to choose acreage at each fertilizer level, Ai, and the
target income, ￿, to minimize, Zt
-, the negative deviation of IAVC from its mean over the
sharecropper’s planning horizon t=1 to T.  Equation 3 requires that income deviations in
all years, (Ipt - I
¯
p) Ap for peanuts and ￿ (Iit - I
¯
i) Ai for corn, at least cover the negative
income deviation.  Income is per acre IAVC from equation 1, multiplied by appropriate￿
acreage choices.  Equation 4 defines the target income as equivalent to the average from
the corn and peanut enterprises over T.   
Labor use in peanuts, Lpm Ap, and corn, ￿ Lcmi Ai for all i fertilizer levels, is
summed across six two-month increments to match the activities on the farm.  According
to equation 5, total labor use must be no more than 5,200 hours available from the
sharecropper and his or her spouse working half the year at 40 hours per week and half at
60 hours per week.  In practice, this constraint is rarely binding, so extra labor is not
typically purchased by the sharecropper.   The variables and parameters used in this model,
their definitions, and their unit of measurement  are presented in Table 1.
The peanut-corn farm is constrained to be no larger than 400 acres in equation 6. 
This is the average size of a commercial peanut farm in Georgia and Southeast Alabama,
which is a reasonable upper limit for sharecroppers to aspire to operate in order to gain
economy of size (Nelson et al., 1991).  Equation 7 requires that corn and peanut acreage
be equal, consistent with a crop rotation system in which the two crops alternate on the
same field in subsequent years so that half of the acreage on the farm is in each crop in any
year.  Thus, choice of all Ai determines Ap.  Equation 8 are the nonnegativity constraints.
We assume that as long as the sharecropper can pay back the total portion of the
cost share after harvest, he or she obtains capital for variable cost for the next season from
the landowner.  Since production credit from landlord to tenant is common in
sharecropping, we do not include a production capital constraint in this study (Braverman
and Stiglitz, 1986).￿￿
The maximum possible target income is obtained by optimizing the model subject
to the resource constraints in the absence of risk.  We parametrically reduced ￿ and
analyzed the effect on the sharecropper’s corn acreage decisions, Ai, and risk tolerance, Zt
-
.  IAVC varies with yield even though input choices are the same each year.  We set T
equal to 30 years, the average duration of a peanut farmer’s career.
The Regret Minimizing Model
To model the regret minimizing sharecropper, we adopted the linear programming model
suggested by Hazell (1970).  As with risk minimization, the idea is to avoid loss, but the
loss is defined as a missed opportunity to receive the highest (perfect foresight) income,
not a drop in income below a threshold.  Thus, regret minimization is a more optimistic
view of risk, where the fear is that the realized outcome is below the maximum possible
income, which may be substantially higher than the target income that guarantees
household survival.  
When more than two choices exist, any choice may influence the regret
experienced with all others.  Even a choice not selected may influence which of the
alternative actions is taken (Sugden, 1995).  Thus, given several fertilizer treatment
choices, even if one choice produces a high probability that target income will be attained,
that choice may result in low yield, guaranteeing that the maximum possible income level
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Lcmi Ai ￿ 5200 ￿￿￿￿
minimizing sharecropper selects the most intensive, highest yielding fertilizer treatment of
those that meet the target income.
The sharecropper minimizes the difference between the greatest possible IAVC, It
*,
and the realized IAVC, It, for the planning horizon, T.  The difference between It
* and It is
the regret.  With perfect foresight, the combination that generates It
* would always be
chosen and regret would equal zero.  Since the decision cannot always be perfect, regret is
nonnegative. 










Ai ,R t ￿ 0, all i,t ￿￿￿￿
where Rt is the regret for year t.  It
* is determined by optimizing the risk-free decision for
each time period, 
specified as the upper limit on realized income in equation 11.  
Equation 10 defines the target income as equal to the average from the corn and
peanut enterprises over T.  When ￿ is parametrically varied, the regret-target income
frontier may be traced.  Each acreage choice in this set generates the minimum regret (risk
tolerance) that a farmer experiences for the target income.  Equations 12 through 15 are
resource and nonnegativity constraints identical to those in the MOTAD model. The detail
on variables used in this model, their definitions, and their measurement units are shown in
Table 1.
Model Simulation 
The five fertilizer treatments available to the sharecropper were based on
recommended and applied corn fertilizer levels for the Southeastern U.S.  In pounds NPK￿￿
per acre, the five treatments were 120-25-40 (Corn1), 130-30-40 (Corn2), 140-35-40
(Corn3), 150-40-40 (Corn4), and 160-45-40 (Corn5).  ACES recommends 150-40-40
(Corn4) for corn grown in rotation with peanuts in Alabama (Crews et al., 1994).  The
discrete nature of the treatment choices is consistent with the fixed relationships among
macronutrients in crop production.
 Peanut and corn yields for recommended practices with these five fertilizer
treatments were simulated for a 30-year time horizon using the EPIC software developed
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA; 1990a, 1990b).  The expected corn yields
in bushels per acre associated with the five fertilizer levels were 67.19(Corn1),
69.97(Corn2), 72.58(Corn3), 75.12(Corn4), and 77.51(Corn5).  Peanut and corn input
requirements and prices were obtained from enterprise budgets developed by ACES
(Crews et al., 1994).  We used the same data for the MOTAD and regret models.  
The upper limit on ￿ was $25,238, obtained by optimizing the models under risk
neutrality.  The risk tolerance (negative deviation or regret) - mean IAVC frontier was
traced by parametrically reducing ￿.  For the risk minimizing sharecropper, we set $5,000
as the lower limit on ￿ to simulate fertilizer allocation according to the actual IAVC for
LRFs in the Southeastern U.S., calculated at $5,100 (Jones, 1991).￿￿
Results
Risk Minimizing Situation￿￿
Table 2 shows the results of the MOTAD simulation for the risk minimizing
sharecropper.  At the maximum desired income of $25,238, total absolute deviation was
$5,521, which quantifies the sharecropper’s risk aversion.  Of 200 acres planted to corn,
this sharecropper would allocate nine acres  at fertilizer level Corn2 and 191 acres at
fertilizer level Corn3. 
The sensitivity analysis showed that allocation of acreage by fertilizer level changes
as income goals and risk decline.  At desired IAVC of $25,200, with mean absolute
deviation of $5,352, the sharecropper applies the lower fertilizer level, Corn2, on 142 acres
and applies Corn3 to only 58 acres.  At these expected income-risk combinations, the
sharecropper cultivates all available acreage.
As desired IAVC and risk decline, total acreage cultivated decreases, and the
fertilizer level is reduced and collapsed into only one treatment.  At expected IAVC
$25,100, and total absolute deviation $5,305, the sharecropper plants 199 acres of corn
(and 199 acres of peanuts) with the lowest fertilizer treatment, Corn1.  With further risk
reduction associated with successively lower income requirements, the sharecropper
continues to reduce crop acreage.  At $5,000 desired IAVC, mean absolute deviation is
$1,050 and only 39 acres of corn are planted using Corn1, along with 39 acres of peanuts. 
Under no circumstances does the risk minimizing sharecropper apply more intensive
fertilizer than Corn3.  
The risk minimizing sharecropper with low income aspiration and relatively low
risk tolerance chooses the least intensive fertilizer treatment.  Greater income requirements￿￿
are associated with higher risk acceptability and with more intensive corn fertilizer
applications on more acreage.  The sharecropper may bring more land into cultivation to
meet a higher income desired, at the same time increasing risk undertaken. 
Regret Minimizing Situation
Table 3 gives the results for the regret minimizing sharecropper.  At the highest
desired IAVC of $25,238, the sharecropper’s income regret is $10,700, and all 200 acres
are treated with Corn3, the intermediate fertilizer combination.  Income regret declines
with desired income and acreage is allocated between fertilizer treatments Corn4 and
Corn5.  At desired income equal to $25,200, regret is $10,430, 72 acres of corn are treated
with Corn4 and 128 acres are treated with Corn5.  All acreage is planted, so the
sharecropper also cultivates 200 acres of peanuts.  Greater reliance on Corn5 is associated
with reduced income regret, as the higher fertilizer intensity permits the sharecropper to
reduce the gap between It
* and realized IAVC by increasing yield.
At desired IAVC equal to $25,180, regret is minimized over the range of all desired
incomes for this sharecropper.  Regret is $10,373 and all 200 acres of corn are fertilized at
treatment Corn5, the most intensive nutrient level.  These values are an inflection point in
the regret-IAVC frontier.  As desired IAVC decreases to $25,100, regret increases to
$10,412 and though all acreage receives fertilizer treatment Corn5, cultivated area declines
to 199 acres.  At even lower desired incomes, regret increases and acreage planted
decreases, with Corn5 remaining the preferred fertilizer level.  Finally, income regret of￿￿
$16,500 for the planning horizon exceeds desired IAVC of $15,000, and corn acreage is
reduced to 119 acres.
As desired income declines, it is more probable that realized IAVC will meet the
target.  The desired income can be attained with various combinations of fertilizer
treatments, but greater fertilizer intensity reduces the difference between It
* and realized
IAVC by giving higher per acre yields.  As desired income declines, so does regret, as long
as it is possible to realize IAVC closer to It
* by using more intensive fertilizer applications. 
Acreage reduction at Corn5 forces regret higher because It
* remains the same at Corn5
while realized IAVC is pulled down by declining desired income.
Risk Minimizing vs. Regret Minimizing Situations
Tables 2 and 3 show that at the highest possible IAVC, $25,238, the risk
minimizing sharecropper and the regret minimizing sharecropper both allocate all 200
acres, with most treated at the intermediate fertilizer level, Corn3.  As desired income
declines, the risk minimizing sharecropper responds by first reducing intensity of fertilizer
application, then reducing acreage once constrained at the lowest fertilizer level, Corn1. 
The regret minimizing sharecropper responds by first increasing the intensity of fertilizer
application, then reducing acreage once constrained at the highest fertilizer level, Corn5. 
The same amount of acreage is cultivated under either risk perspective for given
desired income levels, so that at ￿ = $25,000, 198 acres are planted, at ￿=$20,000, 158
acres are planted and at ￿=$15,000, 119 acres are planted. This is due to the identical form￿￿
of the desired income constraints, equation 4 in the MOTAD model and equation 11 in the
regret model.  In adjusting to declining income expectations, the per unit cost of fertilizer
at each treatment is traded off with the yield improvement from using more fertilizer,
resulting in the acreage changes. 
Risk minimizing sharecroppers manage downside income risk by reducing intensity
of fertilizer, using progressively lower intensity on the same number of acres.  In this way,
they reduce the risk that the more costly fertilizer will fail to produce enough income to
meet their target.  At desired income below $25,100, the sharecropper cannot reduce costs
by reducing fertilizer, so instead he or she reduces acreage.  Corn1 is the lower limit on
fertilizer intensity, so acreage must decline in response to the tightened risk tolerance
associated with declining desired income.  The total fertilizer cost for Corn1, r1A1 in
equation 1, and by extension, cost in ￿(Iit - I
¯
i) in equation 3, is reduced and risk (negative
deviation) is minimized for the desired income.
Regret minimizing sharecroppers react to lower desired incomes by increasing
fertilizer intensity in order to realize income as close as possible to the maximum possible
income level.  Allocation of acreage shifts from all 200 acres in Corn3 to a split between
Corn4 and Corn5, with Corn5 dominating.  At desired income below $25,100, less than
200 acres are planted at the highest fertilizer treatment, Corn5.  As desired income
declines, the divergence of realized IAVC from It
* in equation 10 increases so income
regret increases, indicating lower tolerance for risk of making the wrong production
decision.  The sharecropper applies less of the highest intensity treatment when constrained￿￿
from choosing intensity higher than Corn5 because additional acres at Corn5 add more to
the optimal income, It
*, than to realized income, ￿IitAi, making regret larger as desired
income declines.  Desired income can be met at least cost with less acreage in Corn5, but
lower desired incomes cause greater divergence between realized and maximum income. 
Under both risk perspectives, at desired income below $25,180, acreage is not fully
utilized even when it is available if fertilizer rate is not permitted to change.  The risk
minimizing sharecropper would prefer to plant all 200 acres of corn only if at intensity less
than Corn1 and the regret minimizing sharecropper would prefer to plant all 200 acres of
corn only if at intensity greater than Corn5.  In both cases, the risk tolerance decreases as
desired income decreases.  Both choices are bounded, so that acreage must be reduced
when desired income falls in order to minimize risk.  
The different risk measures cause the intensity level chosen to move in opposite
directions.  For the risk minimizer, only the effect on realized income matters, so the
lowest intensity that can meet desired income is chosen.  For the regret minimizer, the
difference between realized and maximum possible income matters, so to have a chance to
realize the optimum, the highest intensity is chosen. 
Conclusions
Our analysis shows that a sharecropper uses different fertilizer treatments when minimizing
risk depending on risk perspective and desired income.  If a sharecropper practicing a
peanut-corn rotation is constrained to select only one level of corn fertilizer, less or more
than the optimal amount of fertilizer for the risk perspective may be applied. Variations in￿￿
fertilizer use due to risk behavior are obscured if the acreage allocation decision is modeled
with only one fertilizer choice.  
Regardless of risk perspective adopted, the sharecropper does not use all available
acreage as desired income declines.  Our model constrains cultivation to an upper limit of
400 acres, but not all of this is farmed under certain risk-income scenarios described in
Tables 2 and 3. At decreasing tolerance for risk a sharecropper can obtain the desired level
of income with less acreage than the total available land.
The same desired income is attainable with either Corn1 or Corn5, but the risk
perspective determines which fertilizer intensity is selected.  The observed intensity of
fertilizer use may suggest the risk attitude of the sharecropper.  Consistent with the
application of Sugden (1995), higher input application would be expected for a regret
minimizer.  Higher inputs application costs more per unit to use but generates more yield
per unit of input, making it more likely the sharecropper can realize the desired income.
The typical Southern LRF has a mean operation size of 72 acres, generating
approximately $5,100 IAVC (Nelson et al., 1991; Jones, 1991).  Our models suggest that
at desired income equal to $5,000, the sharecropper would farm 78 acres (39 each in corn
and peanuts) under either risk perspective, with fertilizer intensity Corn1 if a risk
minimizer, and intensity Corn5, if a regret minimizer.  
Nelson et al. (1991) showed with allocative efficiencies that Southern LRFs
overuse fertilizer, but underuse land.  Consistent with this study, our analysis suggest that
the regret minimizing risk perspective is relevant to describe southern sharecroppers.  This￿￿
would mean that the landowner’s interests dominate the cropping decisions.  The
landowner’s ability to dominate the risk perspective would depend on labor supply for
sharecropping and other wage earning opportunities.
Jones (1991) noted that larger farm sizes are needed to raise income for LRFs, but
attention must be paid to the sharecropper’s risk perspective since income desired and risk
tolerance affect input intensity and extent of acreage.  Nonfarm wage earning options not
only raise income for LRFs as suggested by Jones (1991), but also enable sharecroppers to
make input choices according to their own risk perspectives.   
The results obtained in this Southeast US peanut-corn based study are anticipated
for other enterprise and regions.  However, this could be shown only by applying the
method used in this study to the data and problem situations in other regions to identify the
behavior of sharecroppers with regard to their input application decision.￿￿
Table 1. Variable Definitions Used in the Risk Models
Variable Definition (unit)
Profit Function
IAVC income above variable cost ($)
., ￿ output and input share for a sharecropper 
Ai corn acreage
Ap peanut acreage
 Qp   per acre peanut yield (tons)
Qi   per acre corn yield with i
th fertilizer treatment(bushel)
Pp  peanut price ($/tons) 
Pc corn price ($/bushel)
ri cost of j
th category of peanut input ($/treatment)
rj cost of j
th category of corn input ($/treatment)
rk cost of k
th category of corn fertilizer ($/treatment)
Xij quantity of j
th category of input used in i
th type of corn
MOTAD Model
Zt
- Negative deviation of IAVC from the its mean ($)
Ipt IAVC obtained from peanuts in year t ($)
Ip Average IAVC from 30 years of peanut rotation ($)
￿ Desired Income ($)
Lpm   Labor used in peanut in m bimonthly period (hours)
Lcmi  Labor used in i
th corn management in m
th bimonthly period (hours) 
Regret Model
Rt Regret in any given period t ($)
It
* The largest possible IAVC in time period t ($)
Xk quantity of corn fertilizer used in treatment k￿￿
Table 2.  Behavior of a risk minimizing sharecropper 
Acreage Allocation by Fertilizer Level
a
Desired Mean Absolute
IAVC (US$) Income Deviation (US$) Corn1 Corn2 Corn3
25,238 5,521 9 191







a Corn1, Corn2 and Corn3 correspond to corn fertilizer levels 120-25-40, 130-30-40 and
140-35-40 in pounds NPK per acre.  Peanut acreage is equal to the sum of corn acreage.￿￿
Table 3. Behavior of a regret minimizing sharecropper
Acreage Allocation by Fertilizer  Level
a
Desired Income
IAVC (US$) Regret (US$) Corn3 Corn4 Corn5
25,238 10,700 200
25,200 10,430 72 128






a  Corn3, Corn4 and Corn5 correspond to corn fertilizer levels 140-35-40, 150-40-40 and
160-45-40 in pounds NPK per acre.  Peanut acreage is equal to the sum of corn acreage.￿￿
Notes
1 All monetary units are given in U.S. dollars.￿￿
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